This paper explores what is meant by 'being European' in contemporary Bosnia. Over the past two decades, Western politicians have justified interventions in Bosnia through recourse to an Orientalist binary between a rational and progressive 'Europe' against an irrational and retrogressive 'Balkans'. Current efforts to incorporate Bosnia into European structures reproduces this imaginary, though in this instance replacing space with time, suggesting that Bosnia needs to move from a 'Balkan' past to a 'European' future. In this paper I explore the political effects of such imaginaries through two levels of analysis. In the first, I critically examine the ongoing implications of the geopolitical framing of Bosnia as Europe's 'Other'. In the second, I explore how nationalist politicians have deployed European rhetoric in order to stake claims to resources and establish respect. I conclude by arguing that a sovereignty paradox underpins both 'geopolitical' and 'nationalist' European rubrics in Bosnia: while idealising forms of solidarity based on broad social and cultural affiliations such discourses simultaneously seek to promote the state as the primary territorialisation of political life.
Introduction
With the recent expansion of the European Union (EU) into Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have conducted sustained deliberation over who, what or where counts as 'European'. This work has isolated a familiar binary at the heart of such identity formation, citing that the making of the 'European' Self has simultaneously depended upon the casting out of a 'non-European' Other (see Fleming, 2003; Kuus, 2004; Kuusisto, 2004) . This paper engages with one site that experienced such abandonment: the Balkans. It is an enduring refrain to identify the Balkans as Europe's internal Other, a liminal space 'on the doorstep of Europe' to use Tony Blair's phrase (see Glenny, 1999: xxi). Historical surveys of European fiction and travel literature have identified the role played by Balkan localities as sites of deviance and criminality, juxtaposed with evidence of European rationality and progress. The identification of a binary between Europe and the Balkans has led scholars to apply the critical tools of Said's (1978) Orientalism to representations of the Balkans. In so doing, Balkanism has emerged as a distinct form of discursive critique, isolating the power relations masked in representations of Balkan identities and locations.
Over the last two decades Bosnia has acted as a fulcrum for Balkanist imaginaries. In particular, the 1992-5 conflict led to certain observers and combatants explaining the violence as a consequence of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' or 'primordial evil'.
There are two key observations to be made regarding such discursive strategies. The first is that these enunciations do not simply circulate within an aesthetic realm, disconnected from political decisions and actions. They are, to draw on Judith Butler's terminology, performative in that they act as 'citational practice [s] by which discourse produces the effects that it names' (Butler, 1993: 2) . Thus the labelling of the conflict by politicians in Western Europe as a product of 'ancient hatreds' shaped the terms of political and military intervention (see Campbell, 1998; Ó Tuathail, 2002; Jeffrey, 2007) . Secondly, the production of Balkanist explanations of the conflict was not restricted to Western Europe. Such practices have been observed within the former Yugoslav republics, for example Močnik (2005) notes the efforts made by Slovenia's political leaders to present their country's secession as virtuous, progressive and 'European' in comparison with the immoral, retrogressive and 'Balkan' nature of attempts to retain the integrity of the Yugoslav state (see also Patterson, 2003) . In the case of Bosnia the 'othering' of political opponents was not directed at agents acting outside the state, but rather at political opponents operating within Bosnia. For example, politicians and paramilitary leaders deployed Balkanist rhetoric to essentialise Bosnian identities and cast enemy groups as 'primitive' in comparison with the enlightened and 'European' nature of their own dispositions. Such discourses attached specific character traits to the binary between 'Europe' and 'the Balkans', varying from religious affiliation (Christian versus Muslim); alphabet (Latin versus Cyrillic) or cultural outlook (multicultural versus mono-ethnic).
The expansion of the EU into the Balkans has led scholars to reconsider the production of Balkanist binaries and their political effects. In Bosnia, the simultaneous embrace of Europe by both international agencies and local nationalist political parties has re-emphasised the role played by 'being European' in the construction of the Self.
The process of consciously staking out European credentials has been explored in the case of Croatia by Slavenka Drakulić (1996) , where she highlights the trend for commercial buildings previously named 'Balkan' to be re-branded in the mid-1990s as 'Europa'. 'The new name,' she notes 'is loaded with a complexity of positive values' (Drakulić, 1996: 11) . While a similar reliance on the virtue of European associations can be observed in contemporary Bosnia, the implications of divergent political groups using European rhetoric requires analysis. Therefore, as claims to Bosnia's Balkan past legitimised particular styles of international intervention during the conflict, articulations of Bosnia's European future are equally performative. And just as such imaginaries were not restricted to external actors outside the Bosnian state, so too has 'being European' become a universal aspiration amongst Bosnian political parties. The question, then, is not whether Europe is perceived in a positive sense in contemporary Bosnian political discourses, but rather what is conceived as 'European' in such rubrics.
In this paper I will seek to address this question through an examination of the political effects of European discourses in contemporary Bosnia. Using case-study material from 'geopolitical' and 'nationalist' discourses, I will look to explore the forms of solidarity and territorialisation on which contemporary Europeanization depends. In doing so I will argue that a sovereignty paradox underpins both 'geopolitical' and 'nationalist' European rubrics in Bosnia: while idealising forms of solidarity based on broad social and cultural affiliations such discourses simultaneously seek to promote the state as the primary territorialisation of political life. Though notionally cosmopolitan in its invocation of an ethical and political community operating beyond the particularities of an individual state, the evidence from Bosnia suggests that European ideals look to solidify forms of citizenship and territory firmly rooted in the state. Bosnia. In the following argument this interview data is corroborated and compared to two archives of textual material: documentation connected to political parties and reports produced by the international organisations supervising and observing Bosnia. It is not my intention to use this data to draw expansive conclusions regarding the Bosnian state, but rather collate these different forms of evidence in order to explore a number of situated European vocabularies in Bosnia.
The argument in this paper is made over three sections. The first surveys the recent history of Balkanist interpretations of Bosnia's past. This theoretical work stakes out two particular points for critique within Balkanist interpretations of Bosnian history: first, the notion of a coherent, democratic Western European polity that is required to intervene and 'correct' social failings in Bosnia; and second, that this binary can be spatially delineated between West and East. Building on this material, the second section traces how international agents in Bosnia have relied on Balkanist binaries to shape international interventions both during the conflict and in the post-conflict period. In particular, the notion of 'transition', suggesting that Bosnia must travel from its Balkan past to a European future, has become normalised within international discourses. But through analysis of the political effects of such enunciations, I argue that European aspirations mask the preoccupation of intervening agencies with strengthening the power 
Balkanism
The land was wild, the people impossible. What could be expected of women and children, creatures whom God had not endowed with reason, in a country where even the men were violent and uncouth? Nothing these people did or said had any significance, nor could it affect the affairs of serious, cultivated men (Andrić, 2000: 24) . In drawing attention to the importance of imaginary geographies within projects of colonial rule in the Balkans Andrić's work serves as a relevant starting point for an exploration of the role of Balkanism within the enactment of foreign and domestic policy in Bosnia. For Maria Todorova (1997) critiques of Balkanism draw attention to the multiple mechanisms and registers through which the Balkans have served as a 'repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and the 'West' has been constructed' (Todorova, 1997: 188 126). Goldsworthy is clear that these representations, which she argues amount to 'imaginative colonialism', have a performative force: 'a cultural great power seizes and exploits the resources of an area, while imposing new frontiers on its mind map and creating ideas which, reflected back, have the ability to reshape reality' (p. 3).
As alluded to earlier, this exploration of the representative mechanisms through which Self and Other are mapped onto Europe and the Balkans draws on Edward Said's Orientalism (1978) . But as a number of scholars have argued, there are specificities to the intellectual and imperial histories of the Balkans that preclude unproblematic transpositions of Said's reflections on the portrayal of the Orient (Bakić- Hayden, 1995; Fleming 2003; Todorova, 1998) . As Fleming (2003) suggests, both Balkanism and Orientalism focus their critique on a 'system of representation' but 'this system is based on different referents --historical, geographical, and conceptual' (p. 13). Specifically, despite Ottoman rule, the Balkan countries were not colonized in the same fashion as the Orient. It is argued the absence of Western European colonial rule cannot be adequately replaced by an 'imaginary colonialism' of the style articulated by Goldsworthy above (ibid.). Thus despite the clear parallels between Balkanism and Orientalism in the field of knowledge production, the specific history of the Balkans renders the distinction between a colonial West and a colonised East more difficult to delineate. Indeed, one of the strengths of Balkanist critique is its encapsulation of the hybridity and dynamism of relations of domination, in a situation where Balkan people perceive each other as 'both colonial rulers and colonial subjects' (Bjelić, 2005: 6) . Recent studies of political discourses within the Former Yugoslavia have drawn attention to this appropriation of Balkanist tropes by local politicians in order to demonstrate 'Western' credentials while orientalising political opponents as betraying 'Eastern' cultural or social practices (see Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Bjelić and Savić, 2005) . It has thus been argued that Balkanism 'meanders between Orientalism and Occidentalism, once as a representational mechanism, again as a subjectivational process' (Bjelić, 2005: 5) .
Building on this distinction between the representational and the subjectivational, Močnik (2005) isolates two types of relations of domination encompassed within the ideology of Balkanism: 'the relations of geo-political and economic hegemony, and the relations of internal domination within the societies geopolitically stigmatized as "Balkan" ' (p. 79) . This is an important distinction that highlights the two spheres in which the binary between 'Europe' and 'non-Europe' is analysed in this paper. In the first instance, I explore the geopolitical making of Bosnia as a site of intervention, cast out as a 'non-European' Other. It is not my intention to provide a full exegesis of the cultural foundations of what can be termed 'Balkanist geopolitics', but rather to focus on its effects. This discussion thus explores the mechanisms that have been put in place to bring Bosnia 'into Europe'. In the second instance I build on what Močnik terms 'internal domination', the means through which Balkanism is reasserted within Bosnia in order to stake claims to resources and establish respect. The strategies through which European credentials are articulated in Bosnia serves to both mirror Balkanist geopolitics (the conditions for its continued survival in post-conflict Bosnia. The central state institutions were left with little power and a cumbersome tripartite presidential system consisting of eight-month rotating tenures. Consequently, many of the central Bosnian government powers were devolved to the two entities and Brčko District, loosely federated as they were within the Bosnian state.
The sub-division of Bosnia into the two entities and a 'special district' has served to both limit the power of state level institutions and entrench support for nationalist political parties in the ten years since the Dayton Agreement. The elections in late 1996, held to demonstrate to American and Western European electorates that progress was being made in Bosnia, only served to entrench the power of nationalist political parties in the immediate post-war period (Donais, 2000; International Crisis Group, 1996) . Despite fluctuating backing for the more moderate and multi-ethnic Socijaldemokratska Partija Perhaps the most significant element of the denial of the past in contemporary Bosnia is the lack of attention by the international community to issues of reconciliation between ethno-national groups, leading to the proliferation of memorials commemorating mythologised nationalist events and figures (Jeffrey, 2006) .
The notion that Bosnia must 'find its feet', break its 'culture of dependency', or even 'let go of nurse', is prevalent across Western commentary on the post-conflict political landscape of Bosnia (see Conces, 2001; Intermedia, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2003) . In the decade following the Dayton Agreement, international observers have been keen to point to the growing independence of Bosnia, citing that the country is no longer 'post-conflict' but is now confronting similar challenges to other post-socialist states 2 . These comments would suggest that the challenges of fitting the remnants of Bosnian industrial production into international circuits of capital and labour have come to take precedence over issues of keeping belligerent parties at peace. Certainly, it was the preoccupation of local government officials surveyed during the research in Brčko to conform to budgetary norms set out by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded 'District Management Team' 3 . But more recently, this neoliberal transformation has been encapsulated in stark geographical terms: that Bosnia must move 'from Dayton to Brussels' (see Ashdown, 2005a; Judah, 2000; Ó Tuathail, 2005 Karañžić, founder of the SDS, who outlined the exclusive spatiality of the RS through the blunt refrain that "our territories are ours, we can go hungry but we shall remain on them" (Karañžić, 1991) . Such a geographical imagination does not simply outline a set of spatial objectives, but simultaneously emphasises the absolute nature of cultural difference within the political philosophy of the SDS. Echoing the integralist rhetoric of the French and British nationalist politicians studied in the work of Douglas Holmes (2000), it was 'heterogeneity' and 'rootlessness' that was perceived to pose a threat to Serb national interest in Bosnia. An SDS representative in Brčko alluded to this when he stated the key failing of (the multi-ethnic) Brčko District was its heterogeneity, offering the explanation that "we don't like being mixed, when there is mixing there are problems" 5 . This notion of 'mixing' relies on stable, knowable and essentially different ethnic groups comprising the key social and political cleavage in Bosnia.
The creation of the RS, then, was a process of 'un-mixing' the Bosnian population and creating an ethno-nationally homogenous territory. The violence that accompanied this process was both physical and symbolic, from the expulsion of the non-Serb population through to the destruction of references to other ethno-national groups within the built environment. Since Brčko occupied a key strategic location connecting the two halves of the RS the town constituted a particular focus for Serb paramilitary action (see Kadrić, 1995) . Such 'ethnic cleansing' continued in the post-conflict period in both the RS and parts of the Federation through policies passed at the entity level designed to dissuade returns and solidify the gains of the war (see Coward, 2002; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005) . Europe] began to spread the moment people in west European countries lost their sense of real values, that is, when money, material concerns and economic interest took the place of philosophy, religion, history and politics" (Čolović, 2002: 39 In this way, political parties, such as the PDP, create a discursive space to promote Europeanism, while simultaneously blocking constitutional and institutional reform that would assist Bosnian accession to the EU.
Conclusion
One of the darkest moments of the conflict in Brčko was the destruction of the large 19 th century Hotel Posavina in the centre of town in April 1992. The hotel's popular coffee lounge and cinema were destroyed, leaving a charred shell overlooking the town's central square. The hotel was not targeted for its military threat, it was not used as a barracks and it held no strategic value within the geography of the conflict in Brčko. 'Europe', then, does not act as a marker of virtue, a sign of the benevolent intentions of international agencies or a radical break from the nationalist past of parties such as the SDS. Rather it is a discourse of occlusion, a term that serves to mask the political practice structured around struggles over state power.
